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Briefing Paper 
THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM:PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 
by Bill Stewart, Department of Economics 
The European Monetary System (EMS) came into existence in March 1979. It 
was only when the exchange rate stability of the Bretton Woods system began 
to disintegrate in the late 1960*s and early 1970's that the need for a 
separate Community monetary arrangement became a pressing issue. Existing 
and future economic integration in the EEC achieved through tariff reduction 
and agricultural policy were apparently under threat as a result of exchange 
rate instability and uncertainty. The "snake" arrangement of the 1970's 
which represented an earlier attempt to limit exchange rate variations and 
secure greater monetary co-operation, did not prove to be entirely 
satisfactory if only because it contained non-EEC members and perhaps more 
important did not have in its membership, at least continuously, certain 
major EEC countries, France, Italy and the UK. 
The continuing uncertainties of the floating exchange rate system and in 
particular the volatility of the US dollar encouraged a further attempt at 
monetary co-operation, which bore fruit in the EMS system which began to 
operate officially on March 13, 1979. The intention was to secure a zone of 
monetary stability in the EEC to further the economic and political 
integration of the Community. 
Operational Features 
1. The European Currency Unit 
Each currency has a central rate determined in terms of European 
Currency Units (ECU). The ECU is a weighted basket of EMS currencies 
consisting of a fixed amount of each participating currency. Although 
the amounts of each currency have remained fixed agreed changes in the 
central rates have brought about significant changes in the valuation of 
each currency and therefore in the weight of each currency in the 
basket. (Table 1) 
The ECU also features as denominator for operations in both the 
intervention and credit mechanisms, as a means of determining the need 
for intervention under the divergence indicator (see below), as a means 
of settlements for EMS obligations and as a reserve asset of EMS central 
banks. Recently the ECU has also acquired a role in private capital 
markets. 
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2. The Parity Grid 
The ECU central rates are used to establish a grid of bilateral central 
rates in terms of national currencies around which fluctuations of plus 
or minus 2.25% are permitted (plus or minus 6% in the case of Italy). 
It is these belateral exchange rate margins which countries are required 
to support in the foreign exchange markets by unlimited intervention. 
The agreed bilateral exchange rates are not irrevocably fixed but can be 
changed by mutual agreement, as they have been on seven occasions now, 
the most recent being on 21 March 1983. 
TABLE 1 COMPOSITION OF THE ECU IN NATIONAL CURRENCIES, ECU CENTRAL 
RATESINNATIONALCURRENCIES AND CHANGING WEIGHTS OF 
PARTICIPATING CURRENCIES, MARCH 1979 AND MARCH 1983 
Deutchmark 
Pound Sterling 
French Francs 
Italian Lira 
Dutch Guilder 
Belgian/Luxembourg 
Francs 
Danish Krone 
Irish Pound 
Currency 
Compositi 
of the ECU 
(1) 
0.828 
0.0885 
1.15 
109.00 
0.286 
3.80 
0.217 
0.00759 
Rate Rate 
on 13/3/79 21/3/83 
per ECU 
(2) 
2.51064 
0.663247 
5.79831 
1148.15 
2.72077 
39.4582 
7.08592 
0.662638 
per ECU 
(3) 
2.21515 
0.629650 
6.79271 
1386.78 
2.49587 
44.3662 
8.04412 
0.71705 
% 
* Weights* 
Change 
(4) 
+11.77 
+ 5.06 
-17.15 
-20.78 
+ 8.27 
-12.44 
-13.52 
- 8.21 
13/3/79 
(5)=1-2 
33.0 
13.3 
19.8 
9.5 
10.5 
9.6 
3.1 
1 .1 
I 
Weights* 
21/3/83 
(6)=1-3 
37.4 
14.1 
16.9 
7.9 
11.5 
8.6 
2.7 
1 .1 
+ appreciation - depreciation 
* on the basis of central rates 
3. The Divergence Indicator 
As well as the parity grid with a central rate and intervention limits 
established in national currencies there is also a divergence indicator 
calculated in terms of ECU designed to detect Community currencies that 
happen to deviate upwards or downwards from the Community average as 
represented by the ECU. If a currency moves by more than 75% of the 
maximum divergence permitted in terms of its ECU rate there is a 
presumption that that country will take unilateral action to prevent or 
restrict further movement. The divergence limit established for each 
currency is not the crude plus or minus 2.5%, but is calculated to take 
account of the varying weights which currencies have in the composition 
of the ECU. The introduction or a divergence indicator is an attempt to 
limit the tendency for any one currency to depart from the system as a 
whole and to put the onus on that currency to reverse that development. 
The divergence indicator has not been very successful in promoting 
symmetry in adjustment since on the occasions when it has been triggered 
the pressure has fallen overwhelmingly on the weak currencies. 
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4. The Credit Mechanism 
Because of the obligation to undertake unlimited intervention when the 
bilateral exchange rate margin limits are reached by using the 
appropriate participating currency a credit mechanism is an essential 
feature of the system. Under the Very Short Term Financing Facility 
unlimited credit is available for a restricted period. Up to 50% of any 
outstanding obligation in this Facility may be settled in ECUs, but 
little use has been made of this opportunity to settle in ECUs. The Very 
Short Term facility has been extensively used but no use has been made 
of the short and medium term facilities which are available on a 
conditionable basis for longer-term balance of payments support. 
5. Creation of ECU 
ECUs are provided to central banks against 20$ of their gold holdings 
and U S dollar reserves. These transfers are arranged on the basis of 
revolving three monthly swaps with the European Monetary Co-operation 
Fund, with adjustments at the roll-over date to maintain contributions 
at the required 20% level. Since gold is valued at a market-related 
price this system has had the effect of activating the gold reserves of 
participating currencies. As the price of gold and the price of dollars 
have fluctuated considerably it has also had the effect of producing 
significant variations in the value of ECU created. (See Table 2) 
TABLE 
Swap Operations 
starting in 
April 
July 
Oct 
Jan 
April 
July 
Oct 
Jan 
April 
July 
Oct 
Jan 
April 
July 
Oct 
Dec 
1979 
1979 
1979 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1981 
1981 
1981 
1981 
1982 
1982 
1982 
1982 
1982 
2 THE 
Gold 
CREATION OF ECU' 
Transfers 
m. ounces 
80.7 
85.3 
85.3 
85.5 
85.6 
85.6 
85.6 
85.6 
85.7 
85.7 
85.7 
85.7 
85.7 
85.7 
85.7 
85.7 
Gold Price 
ECUs per 
ounce 
165 
185 
211 
259 
370 
419 
425 
447 
440 
406 
402 
368 
327 
324 
367 
367 
S BY SWAP OPERATIONS 
US Dollar 
Transfers 
billions 
13.4 
15.9 
16.0 
15.5 
14.4 
13.7 
13.9 
14.5 
14.2 
12.7 
11.5 
11.7 
10.5 
9.9 
10.0 
9.6 
$/ECU 
Exchange 
Rate 
0.75 
0.73 
0.70 
0.69 
0.77 
0.70 
0.71 
0.75 
0.84 
0.97 
0.91 
0.92 
1 .00 
1 .04 
0.92 
0.92 
Counterpart 
in ECUs 
billions 
23.3 
27.4 
29.3 
32.9 
42.8 
45.5 
46.3 
49.2 
49.7 
47.1 
45.0 
42.3 
38.6 
38.1 
42.3 
41 .9 
Source: Commission of the European Communities 
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EMS in Retrospect 
EMS was i n t r o d u c e d in 1979 a m i d s t h igh hopes t h a t i t would a c h i e v e i t s 
o b j e c t i v e of providing a zone of monetary s t a b i l i t y in Europe, al though one 
of t h e EEC members , t h e UK, w h i l s t f o r m a l l y a member of EMS does not 
p a r t i c i p a t e in i t s most impor tan t e lement , the exchange r a t e mechanism. 
Policy Convergence 
There i s widespread acceptance t h a t to meet EMS o b j e c t i v e s progress would 
have t o be made w i t h r e s p e c t t o conve rgence of economic p o l i c i e s between 
members. W h i l s t conve rgence i s a c e n t r a l l o n g - t e r m aim in t h e EEC w i t h 
regard to r a i s i n g and e q u a l i s i n g l i v i n g s tandards convergence in the the EMS 
i s more concerned with exchange r a t e s t a b i l i t y and domest ic p r i c e and cos t 
developments c o n s i s t e n t wi th t h a t s t a b i l i t y . Whils t growth and p roduc t i v i t y 
are impor tan t de t e rminan t s of r e a l exchange r a t e s in the long run t h e r e was 
an acceptance t h a t in the shor t run convergence in such nomimal magnitudes 
as p r i c e l e v e l s , money supp ly and wages would be of more i m p o r t a n c e . 
Without such convergence changes in exchange r a t e s wi th in EMS would become 
so f r e q u e n t as t o c a s t d o u b t s on t h e v i a b i l i t y of t h e s y s t e m . If a f i x e d 
exchange r a t e sys tem i s t o o p e r a t e fo r any long p e r i o d p a r t i c i p a t i n g 
c o u n t r i e s l o s e independent con t ro l over monetary and f i s c a l p o l i c i e s , i . e . 
over i n t e r e s t r a t e s , money supply, budgetary pol icy e t c . 
The EMS i s no t , nor was i t intended to be a f ixed exchange r a t e system, but 
the i n t e n t i o n was undoubtedly through po l i cy convergence to secure g r e a t e r 
s t a b i l i t y than had e x i s t e d p rev ious ly . 
How has the EHS fared? 
Exchange Rate S t a b i l i t y 
S h o r t - r u n e x c h a n g e - r a t e v a r i a b i l i t y be tween members of t h e EMS has 
undoub ted ly e x h i b i t e d g r e a t e r s t a b i l i t y than p r e v i o u s l y , w h i l s t exchange 
r a t e v a r i a b i l i t y a g a i n s t non-EMS c u r r e n c i e s has increased (see Table 3) . 
Although s h o r t - r u n v a r i a b i l i t y has been reduced the c e n t r a l exchange r a t e s 
themselves have not remained fixed (see Table 1). There have now been seven 
changes in ECU c e n t r a l r a t e s , t h e l a t e s t change in March 1983 i n v o l v i n g 
a d j u s t m e n t in a l l c e n t r a l r a t e s . In t h e l a s t t h r e e changes t h e l a r g e s t 
b i l a t e r a l changes have a l l been over 9%. In t e r m s of t h e ECU c e n t r a l r a t e 
t h e r e have been c u m u l a t i v e changes from t h e i n i t i a l r a t e v a r y i n g from a 
deva lua t ion of over 20% for the I t a l i a n l i r a to an a p p r e c i a t i o n of over 11% 
for t h e Deu t schemark . With t h e i n c r e a s i n g f r equency and s i z e of c e n t r a l 
r a t e a d j u s t m e n t f e a r s have been e x p r e s s e d fo r t h e smooth o p e r a t i o n of t h e 
system and in p a r t i c u l a r t h a t s p e c u l a t i v e c a p i t a l movements encouraged by 
these s i z e a b l e changes in c e n t r a l r a t e s w i l l come to play a d i s r u p t i v e r o l e 
in t h e s y s t e m , s i m i l a r t o t h e r o l e they p layed in t h e b r e a k - u p of t h e 
Bre t ton Woods system. 
However, t h e changes in exchange r a t e s have been l e s s than for many 
c u r r e n c i e s o u t s i d e the system, Fu r the r , the change in r a t e s have a l l been 
agreed by the p a r t i c i p a t i n g members and have been supported by appropr i a t e 
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domestic p o l i c i e s . The changes have a l l been in the appropr i a t e d i r e c t i o n 
t o a c h i e v e a d j u s t m e n t and have never had to be r e v e r s e d once i n t r o d u c e d . 
The changes have not f u l l y compensated for r e l a t i v e p r i c e l e v e l changes 
which s u g g e s t s t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i n g c o u n t r i e s a r e p r e p a r e d to p l a c e some 
emphas i s on d o m e s t i c a d j u s t m e n t p o l i c i e s and no t r e l y whol ly on exchange 
r a t e changes t o o f f s e t p r i c e l e v e l d e v e l o p m e n t s . What i s not c l e a r 
however, i s whether membership of the EMS caused the adjustments or whether 
they would have taken place in any case . 
Price Level Changes 
The need f o r change i n e x c h a n g e r a t e s i s i n d i c a t e d by t h e l a c k of 
convergence as f a r as p r i c e l e v e l changes a re c o n c e r n e d . Compared t o 
e a r l i e r p e r i o d s r e c e n t e x p e r i e n c e has no t been s a t i s f a c t o r y a l t hough t h e 
1982 f i g u r e s show an improvement (Tab le 4) . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y t h e money 
supply f i g u r e s show a s i m i l a r d i s p e r s i o n of r e s u l t s (Tab le 5 ) . These a r e 
d i sappo in t ing r e s u l t s in a period when the reduct ion in i n f l a t i o n apparent ly 
enjoyed a h igh p r i o r i t y in a l l p a r t i c i p a t i n g c o u n t r i e s . Should such a 
consensus b reak down t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r l o n g - r u n exchange r a t e s t a b i l i t y 
would be f u r t h e r r educed . S i m i l a r d i s p a r i t i e s e x i s t w i t h r ega rd t o money 
cost changes, p a r t i c u l a r l y wages, and r a t e s of i n t e r e s t . 
TABLE 3 VARIABILITY OF NOMINAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES 
1 
AGAINST EMS CURRENCIES 1974-82 
1979 1980 1981 
8.1 6.2 17.0 
26.3 7.8 17.7 
9.2 7.3 21.8 
12.2 6.5 28.0 
12.1 6.9 15.5 
14.1 11.5 27.9 
9.3 7.5 22.8 
13.0 7.7 21.5 14.1 26.2 
78.9 88.2 32.5 66.6 19.9 
35.3 52.3 44.6 44.1 21.3 
23.0 40.9 71.2 45.0 47.9 
3 
Average Non-EMS 37.3 45.7 60.5 49.4 51.9 29.7 
1. Weighted average (IMF Multilateral Exchange Rate Model weights) of 
variability of bilateral nominal exchange rates against EMS currencies, 
with variability measured by co-efficient of variation (multiplied by 
1,000) of bilateral exchange rates, monthly data. 
2. First nine months only 
3. Unweighted average. 
Source: IMF Occasional Paper No 19 Table 8 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Average 
Japan 
3 
EMS 
United Kindom 
United States 
Average 
1974-78 
20.3 
25.0 
31.7 
29.3 
36.0 
36.0 
21.1 
28.5 
44.5 
32.6 
34.7 
Average 
1979-81 
10.4 
17.3 
12.8 
15.6 
11.5 
17.8 
13.2 
2 
1982 
37.8 
18.4 
34.1 
29.4 
22.0 
18.6 
22.9 
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TABLE 4 CONSUMER PRICE CHANGES WITHIN EHS COUNTRIES 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
1968 
1960 
3.2 
5.3 
2.9 
3.9 
3.8 
3.8 
3.9 
1974 
1968 
5.9 
8.6 
5.4 
7.2 
10.3 
8.7 
7.8 
Annual 
1978 
1974 
7.9 
9.9 
4.5 
9.8 
15.1 
16.7 
7.4 
Rates of 
1979 
1978 
3.9 
9.6 
4.0 
10.9 
13.4 
15.0 
4.3 
Change % 
1980 
1979 
6.5 
11.5 
5.3 
13.2 
18.3 
20.4 
6.6 
1981 
1980 
7.6 
10.7 
5.9 
12.5 
20.5 
19.0 
6.7 
1982 
1981 
8.7 
10.7 
5.3 
12.0 
17.2 
16.7 
5.9 
Mean 
Range 
3.8 
2.4 
United Kingdom 3.5 
7.7 
4.9 
8.7 
10.2 
12.2 
15.6 
8.7 
11.0 
14.3 
11.7 
15.1 
15.5 
11.8 
14.6 
10.7 
10.8 
11.9 
8.6 
Source: Eurostat 
In the light of these continuing divergent trends it is not surprising that 
there have been a number of exchange rate adjustments within EMS. Such 
adjustments will continue to be necessary so long as important economic 
variables show such disparate outcomes. They will only cease when 
governments demonstrate the political will to take action in the field of 
money supply, budget deficits and wages consistent with exchange rate 
stability, or cede such power to some EEC agency such as a European Monetary 
Fund, operating as a Community central bank. 
TABLE 5 MONEY 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Mean 
Range 
UK 
STOCK 
Money 
- PERCENTAGE CHANGE FROM 
Stock 
Measure 
M2 
M2 
M2 
M3 
M3 
M2 
M2 
M3 
1978 
9.6 
8.6 
12.4 
11.0 
28.7 
22.1 
4.2 
13.8 
24.5 
13.3 
1979 
6.2 
10.6 
14.7 
6.0 
19.0 
20.3 
7.0 
12.0 
14.3 
11.9 
THE PRECEDING 
1980 
2.7 
7.8 
10.0 
6.2 
17.9 
12.7 
3.8 
8.7 
15.2 
10.9 
1981 
5.9 
9.0 
11.5 
4.8 
17.6 
10.0 
5.3 
9.1 
12.8 
9.7 
PERIOD 
1982 
5.9 
11.5 
11.7 
7.1 
12.9 
17.0 
8.8 
10.7 
11 .1 
10.9 
Source: European Economy, August/September 1983, Supplement A 
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Has the ENS been a success? 
One can argue t h a t t he c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e of t h e EMS o f f e r s ev idence of 
success and t h a t i t s members f ee l i t to be s u f f i c i e n t l y important to keep i t 
in e x i s t e n c e . I t has not ach ieved c o m p l e t e exchange r a t e s t a b i l i t y but 
t h a t was not i t s a im. The exchange r a t e pe r fo rmance of i t s members 
compares favourably with coun t r i e s ou t s ide the EMS. However, the cont inuing 
and regula r need for agreed changes in exchange r a t e s r e f l e c t i n g the lack of 
convergence in economic p o l i c i e s r a i s e s doubts on i t s long-term prospec ts i f 
cu r r en t a t t i t u d e s cont inue to p r e v a i l . Members w i l l not find i t poss ib le to 
r e c o n c i l e t h e p u b l i c l y exp re s sed d e s i r e for p o l i c y c o - o r d i n a t i o n and the 
freedom to a c t i n d e p e n d e n t l y . The normal t r i a l s and t r i b u l a t i o n s of 
a s s i m i l a t i n g new members w i l l place fu r the r s t r a i n on the system with the 
entry of Spain and Portugal in p rospec t . 
TABLE 6 IHTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE 1958 AMD 1981 AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
EXPORTS IMPORTS 
1958 1981 1958 1981 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Denmark 
Germany 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlan 
UK 
ids 
53.5 
58.3 
35.9 
28.6 
83.6 
33.8 
57.5 
20.3 
70.0 
47.0 
46.9 
48.2 
69.8 
43.3 
71.3 
42.8 
54.7 
59.0 
35.2 
26.7 
68.4 
29.8 
50.1 
20.3 
59.5 
48.1 
48.2 
48.2 
74.9 
40.8 
52.0 
38.6 
Source: European Economy, November 1982 
In t h e meantime should t h e UK made a u n i l a t e r a l d e c i s i o n to become a f u l l 
member of t h e EMS in t h e l i g h t of i t s i n c r e a s i n g i nvo lvemen t w i t h p a r t n e r 
Community coun t r i e s? (see Table 6) The recen t comments of the Chancellor a t 
the Lord Mayor's Banquet suggest t h a t whi le the government sees a ro l e for 
t he exchange r a t e in t he d e t e r m i n a t i o n of i t s o v e r a l l economic p o l i c y i t 
s e e s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n fo r a c c e p t i n g some p u b l i s h e d exchange r a t e t a r g e t 
e i t h e r in s ide or ou ts ide the EMS. Whils t i t may be argued t h a t an exchange 
r a t e t a r g e t o f f e r s an a l t e r n a t i v e t o a money supp ly t a r g e t , of wha tever 
v a r i e t y , t he C h a n c e l l o r i s a p p a r e n t l y u n w i l l i n g t o concede the a d d i t i o n a l 
deg ree of freedom which an u n c o n s t r a i n e d exchange r a t e p r o v i d e s . His judgement must be t h a t the u n c e r t a i n t i e s s u r r o u n d i n g such i s s u e s as the 
p e t r o - c u r r e n c y r o l e of t he pound w i t h t h e a t t e n d a n t r i s k of s p e c u l a t i v e 
c a p i t a l f lows, the dollar/DM exchange r a t e , the d i f f i c u l t y of e s t a b l i s h i n g 
an e q u i l i b r i u m s t e r l i n g r a t e w i t h i n t h e EMS and t h e absence of any s t r o n g 
p o l i t i c a l p ressure to j o i n e i t h e r from EMS members, or on the grounds of UK 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t make the avoidance of a commitment to some published exchange 
r a t e t a r g e t a t t r a c t i v e . 
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